Charity and peace for all mankind are usually ranged among the characteristic aspects of the message put forward in the sacred texts on which the Christian religion is based. Yet the official interpreters of these texts (theologians and ecclesiastical office holders) in Western countries of the early modern period are often associated with exactly the opposite: with hostility, antagonism, belligerencein short, with what was at the time called odium theologicum or theological hatred. This term of opprobrium was usually bestowed on theologians by the objects of their attack and by other immediate adversaries, by critics of ecclesiastical influence (often jurists and philosophers; sometimes physicians), and by the representatives of suppressed religious minorities. One would of course do well not to accept such accusations at face value. Nevertheless, it is a notion that crops up regularly in early modern intellectual and religious history that theologians, especially those who belonged to the state church and held orthodox doctrinal views, too often displayed an antisocial tendency toward disputatiousness.
between 1795 and 1813, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the remainder of the period. Dutch theological history during this time was dominated by Protestantism, particularly in its Reformed or Calvinist variety. Something could certainly be said about Roman Catholicism (which comprised a very large minority in the Netherlands), if only to demonstrate that none of the developments discussed here is inherently Protestant. However, Roman Catholics will be left out of consideration since they rarely participated in public debate until the first decades of the nineteenth century.
The period in question is one of important changes in the way public dispute was intellectually legitimized. Still relatively fresh in the memories of divines who lived around 1670 was the conflict over Arminianism of the first two decades of the century. These disputes over freedom of the will and divine predestination had brought the United Provinces to the brink of civil war, and those disputes had been resolved by military power and the public enforcement of dogmatic decisions made by the Synod of Dort (1618 -19). Theologians were well aware of the social and political dangers of disputes over dogma. Nevertheless, by 1670 a new and equally complicated dispute over doctrinal issues had divided the theological ranks. This time, the dispute concerned the question of how best to interpret the Bible. Should the Old and New Testaments be seen as an essen- trast, the majority of divines avoided strife as best they could. Dispute, in the three or four decades before 1840, was simply not done.
Changes in the nature of public debate may be said to fall into three phases (though with considerable overlaps between them): 1670-1750, 1750-1800, and 1800 -1840. The method best used, perhaps, to examine these changes is that of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte). Conceptual history involves the analysis of variations and modifications in the meaning of words over the course of time, and analysis of the appearance of new words, with reference to their use in various linguistic and social contexts. 2 Although the source material here consists almost wholly of texts produced by theologians, above all academic theologians, the focus in each period shifts from one kind of "public" to another: 3 from an academic, ecclesiastical, and confessional public in the first phase; to a broad, opinionated, and "enlightened" public in the second; to a "national" public in the third. In order to obtain some idea of the kind of concepts used in legitimizing public dispute, it may be useful, at the outset, to take a closer look at a typical academic text on theological quarreling and to follow this exercise with a brief outline of the vocabulary involved in that and other texts.
The Model Divine
The academic theologian Herman Wits or Witsius (1636 -1708) was regarded throughout the eighteenth century as a paragon of theological modesty. "Composure, peaceableness, and humility guided his mouth and pen," said one clerical commentator in 1795, a judgment that would have been seconded by any of his colleagues. 4 prudence and charity in both." 7 Although he did not found a theological school, he did substantially influence developments in Dutch theology by his mediating stance in the Voetian-Cocceian conflicts. A pupil of Voet himself, Wits developed a theological system based on notions he had gleaned from the Cocceians.
No wonder, then, that Wits inaugurated his professorship at Leiden in 1698 with an address titled Theologus modestus, a response to decades of heated controversy over Cartesianism and Cocceianism. 8 A brief analysis of the contents of this relatively concise oration may reveal what a late-seventeenth-century divine understood by modesty. Wits had resolved to speak on modesty, the virtue most befitting theologians, but also the one most ignored by disputatious divines.
Modesty, as he defined the word, is that equanimity of a well-composed mind by which someone, reflecting moderately upon himself and positively upon others, acts with prudent moderation as befits the kind, character, and consequence of the matters he must treat. 9 A modest man neither despises nor admires himself.
He values without jealousy God's gifts in others. He has learned to control his passions, and thus to restrain his mind, his tongue, and his pen. He is neither too soft nor too rigid, but pliant. He is mild without being timid, patient without being indifferent, serious without being grim, resilient without being boastful, and constant without being obstinate.
Wits then sets out to show how a theologian, if he is to earn the reputation of being modest, should actually learn, teach, and live. It is clear that he who has not been taught himself cannot teach others, and that he who does not respect the virtue Christians call humility cannot be taught at all. The acknowledgment of one's own ignorance is the first step toward true wisdom. "Let him become a fool, that he may be wise," says Paul (1 Cor. 3:18). The modest theologian must empty his mind of all preconceptions and accept the authority of divine revelation, even where the human mind is too limited to grasp it -ubi mirari, non rimari, sapientia summa est: knowing where to marvel and not to inquire is the highest wisdom.
As a teacher, the modest divine must keep in mind that he is only an interpreter, who should neither add to, nor remove from, what has been revealed. To intentionally misinterpret the simple words of Scripture and detract from the extraordinary, the miraculous, or the remarkable is worse than immodesty; it amounts to impertinence, slander, and impiety. On the other hand, a modest theologian need not accept at face value the interpretation of his peers. Nothing is more alien to the nature of Christianity or to the freedom of the New Testament than that a single interpreter should compel his brothers to accept his own read- ing of the sacred texts. However learned we may be, we are all brothers who sit at the feet of one Master. Anyone who arrogates to himself power over his fellow pupils trespasses on the fundamental rules of Christian education: a "modest theologian therefore does not passionately force his own ideas upon another, nor does he endure with fear and credulity the ideas that others force upon him. " The Word of God should be discussed in serene and simple terms, even when it is defended against those who err. Wits condemns the ancient and modern divines who so often castigated their opponents with terms of abuse ("dogs," "pigs," "windbags, " and so on), and he enjoins upon his listeners to understand that heavenly wisdom is pure, peaceful, gentle, docile, full of mercy and good fruits, and free from partiality and hypocrisy ( James 3:17). Wits goes on to point out the need for theologians to follow these principles in daily life, admonishing his colleagues not to indulge in factiousness; and then he concludes with an ode to modesty. What, he asks, will dispose the mind to obedience to God? Modesty. What will deter the mind from temerity toward the mysteries, or help convince others of the truth? Modesty. What will prevent disputes, end the useless controversies that so often agitate people, and dissolve the divisions in church and school? Modesty. What will foster a praiseworthy victory in God's battle? Modesty. What will join together minds and hands in a sacred and inviolable bond of peace and friendship? It is modesty, the queen of virtues.
As Wits's biographer notes, the address Theologus modestus (which elicited "great applause from all his listeners") was largely an echo of an address he had given at the University of Franeker more than two decades before. 10 In this previous address, De vero theologo (1675), Wits had likewise presented his views on the spiritual and intellectual requisites of a theologian. He had argued that a divine should adhere closely to the Holy Scriptures in learning, teaching, and living. 11 In the later oration, Wits similarly stressed adherence to Scripture, but his emphasis had shifted from piety to modesty.
A Note on Vocabulary
In Theologus modestus, Wits associated modesty with both moderation (or control of the passions) and mediation (or impartiality). To trace developments in eighteenth-century discourse on the resolution of disputes, it may be useful to take a short look at the history of these concepts. Given our focus on the Netherlands, this approach will involve an examination of several Dutch words. We shall look in particular at the Dutch equivalents for moderation, modesty, and the mean.
The Dutch word for moderation, moderatie (derived from the Latin mod- eratio and the French modération), which today has an antiquated flavor, was commonly used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to denote temperance. A still well-known example among Dutch linguists is a pun referring to the restraint promised in 1566 by King Philip II of Spain, in the persecution of Dutch heretics. The king's new policy, an early-seventeenth-century historian informs us, was commonly regarded as moorderatie -as "murderation" rather than moderation. 12 The adjective moderaat (moderate) was no less common, and was sometimes used in the same breath with vreedzaam (peaceful) to refer to the ideal clergyman. 13 Those who avoided extremes in the religious disputes over Arminianism in the early seventeenth century, as well as those who followed the mean during the political disputes in the Dutch National Convention of 1796, were known as the moderaten or moderates. 14 Political theorists often praised Dutch republican government as conducive to the exercise of prudent moderation (voorsigtige gemaetigtheit), resulting in a harmonious administration and a political order based on friendship, reason, mutual indulgence, and persuasion. 15 The signification of the term remained fairly constant.
In the course of the period, words of comparable meaning but of Germanic rather than Latin or Romance derivation began to put moderatie in the shade.
Gematigdheid, like moderatie, was used to refer to the composure characteristic of people able to control their passions, people who act and express themselves with moderation and self-discipline. Given the Protestant emphasis on the spoken and written word, the familiarity of this term to seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Dutchmen would have been influenced considerably by the official Bible translation of 1637, which translated the Greek sophronismos in 2 Tim. 1:7 with gematigdheid rather than moderatie. 16 The choice by the Dutch Bible translators of gematigdheid was probably related to contemporary medical usage of the term-and this is the sense evoked in the Vulgate, which used sobrietas for sophronismos, and in the King James Version (1611), which used the phrase "of a sound mind." The Dutch Bible commentators of 1637 explained that gematigdheid referred to "a moderate or sound mind" (gematight ofte gesont verstant), which should be adjoined to stoutheartedness so that the latter does not turn into rashness, ranting, raving, and immodesty. 17 In the seventeenth century, gematigdheid Van is't beste deel (neither too much nor too little, for the mean is the best). 20 The term gulden or gouden middelmaat (golden mean) remained popular for as long as the opinion-making elite was trained in classical scholarship -which is to say, until well into the nineteenth century. A related term is middelmatigheid, the quality possessed by those who keep to the golden mean. The term may be translated as mediocrity, which in the original Latin mediocritas could have a positive connotation ("the state of avoiding extremes"). The latter sense of the word middelmatigheid is obsolete; in present-day usage, the term invariably refers to the condition of being second-rate. There is, incidentally, one other contemporary meaning of middelmatigheid that cannot be found in the dictionaries but that illustrates the semantic proximity of mediocrity to modesty. In 1779, a theologian published an essay "On the Title of the Greek Clergy: Your Mediocrity"-a title, as this divine observed, that was meant to convey a sense of humility. But, he continued, Greek patriarchs were not particularly modest, since they also referred to themselves as "the most holy" and "the most learned," although their piety and their learning were, in fact, quite mediocre. 21 Related both to moderation and the mean is, finally, the word modesty itself.
The Latin original modestia was normally translated into Dutch as bescheidenheid, the quality of being modest or humble. While in sixteenth-and seventeenth- When commenting on the nature of disputes, Dutch theologians returned again and again to the same triad of modesty, moderation, and the mean. And although the triad may be found throughout the period under consideration here, it is conspicuous that divines of the first phase (1670 -1750) had a particular liking for modesty, those of the second phase (1750 -1800) for moderation, and those of the third phase (1800 -1840) for the mean.
Modesty: Containing Conflict
Armed with a rich vocabulary, theologians were able to set about solving the kinds of dispute that had been so notorious since the humanists of the Renaissance had condemned the scholastics for quarreling over supposedly abstruse philosophical issues. Yet even the humanists had not denied the usefulness of dispute as such. They merely rejected dispute for the sake of dispute, as well as the excesses attending on specific quarrels. In fact, controversy was the sine qua non of early modern intellectual life. By 1670, dispute had been firmly institutionalized in the academic curriculum. Apart from public and private lectiones, professors were expected to preside over disputationes, in which students had to learn to defend their theses and to parry objections. But they were required to do so while observing a moral code: disputing students were required, above all, to practice modesty. In practically all the rationes studiorum -guidelines for academic students -which appeared between 1670 and 1840, modesty was stressed as a principal virtue. One accredited expert in controversial or polemical theology listed three moral requirements for theology students: uprightness (probitas), assiduousness (diligentia), and modesty (modestus). A learned but immodest young man is no better than a beautiful but immoral woman. Modesty should be to the student what prudence is to an experienced divine. 25 Etienne Gaussen's De studii theologici ratione (written by a Frenchman but one of the most popular Protestant rationes studiorum in both the Netherlands and Germany) similarly provided a list of moral and intellectual requirements for theology students. The necessary virtues singled out by Gaussen were humility (humilitas) and modesty (modestia). 26 Another leading theologian discussed the threefold injunction that ministers be pious, prudent, and modest. 27 In 1836, Johannes Clarisse, author of the last traditional ratio studiorum in the Netherlands, still recommended modesty, peaceableness, gravity, emotional control, composure, and prudence. 28 Thus it was hardly self-contradictory for an influential academic theologian to preside, in 1652, over a disputation "On Moderation and Toleration." In this disputation, moderatio was defined, explicitly from an ecclesiastical point of view, as that "temperament connected with Christian charity and prudence," exercised by the church, or by persons and gatherings within the church, in order "to introduce or maintain, confirm, restore, and re-establish peace and unity among the churches." 29 Moderation is the means to an end -the termination of ecclesiastical discord; by contrast, toleration is the formal acceptance of certain existing defects (that is, the admission of a measure of disunity and dispute within the church). Such solemn affirmations on the part of divines-to-be that they will respect a common moral code do not, of course, necessarily imply that theology students were peaceable and conducted their academic disputations with due modesty. In 1661, in the midst of the debates over Cartesianism, the senate of the University of Utrecht was obliged to ask the city government to put up a fence around the chair of the defending student, so that his opponents could not physically attack him. 30 Seventeenth-century universities in general, and theological faculties in particular, were not immediately concerned with the progressive accumulation of knowledge through research and publication. They were basically concerned with educating an elite and maintaining the social order; and the former was regarded as a means of achieving the latter. The public to which the various reflections on modesty were addressed consisted in the first place of an academic, if theological, public, including students as well as professors (who generally used students' disputations to expound their own controversial views). In another sense, the public ideally involved in the exercise of modesty was the ecclesiastical public -all those, from elder to minister, holding office in the church. In a still broader sense, however, the discourse on modesty concerned what might be called a confessional public. Like any other established church, the Calvinists' Dutch Reformed Church, in close cooperation with the political administration, used a variety of monitoring agencies and defense mechanisms -ranging from theological faculties to a well-organized system of church councils -to maintain and protect "public" truth. The confessional public was a public qualified by confessional rules, controlled by a clerical estate, backed by political power, and extending itself in time and space by avoiding, controlling, suppressing, or eradicating heterodoxy and other socioreligious deviations from its (public) domain. 31 As a way of managing dispute and tolerating deviance, the pursuit of modesty was integral to the maintenance of orthodoxy.
The way in which Dutch Arminians -who have been consistently portrayed by church historians since the nineteenth century as the chief advocates of theological moderation-used terms such as modesty does not really vary from the way their orthodox Calvinist opponents used it. The term moderation appears frequently in an academic address by Jacob Arminius himself, "On Reconciling Religious Dissensions among Christians": there it is used as a means not to end dispute but to regulate controversy. 32 Uses of modest, modesty, and modestly in book titles are often a distinct signal of the author's polemical intentions -that is to say, a mark of his desire to maintain and defend the confessional public by means of dispute and to extend that public through persuasion. were meant to result in persuasion, but not in the proliferation of intellectual warfare.
The churchman Johannes van den Honert, one of the last academic monoliths of eighteenth-century orthodoxy, still defended such controlled disputatiousness in his address "De mutua Christianorum tolerantia" (1745). Christians, he observed, may openly defend their own particular confessions and "frankly and modestly" (libere modesteque) contest the contradictory views of others, in order to establish the truth. 34 In the eighteenth century, as people struggled to define and expand notions of freedom, the term modesty was more often than not accompanied by frankness or sincerity. Modesty and candor were now the twin virtues universally accepted as indispensable to public debate -accepted as the moral categories required for one who would freely reject religious otherness, even when the otherness in question was that of the state church. 35 In 1781, the author of a pro-Arminian theological treatise could still be praised as being experienced in the "Theological Battle School" and, at the same time, remarkable for his humility. 36 The period between 1670 and 1750 may be seen as the heyday of the confessional public. A relative degree of religious stability had been achieved. Divines were generally as concerned to keep the peace within their own denominations as they were anxious to maintain a balance among the publieke kerk (the public and Michael Bertling at Groningen in 1752. 38 These academic orations were widely known, even if they were not universally appreciated; 39 and their combined effect was to prepare the average divine, spiritually and intellectually, for the civil ethic of politeness, which had begun to make significant headway by the 1760s.
Moderation: Politeness as Civil Ethic
In an inaugural address at the University of Leiden, "On the True Theologian, Who Is Not Truly Orthodox unless He Be Truly Pious" (1761), the academic tradition of orations on modesty was once again revived, on this occasion by the theologian Ewald Hollebeek. 40 The point of Hollebeek's address was that piety is at least as important as doctrine. Comparing the church of his own day with that of the early Christians, he condemned the superfluity of doctrine burdening con- temporary Christians and lamented the general loss of piety, moderation, justice, peace, love, and other values. The true theologian, he observed, is not one who maintains and defends traditional truths with blind faith while condemning and slandering the doctrines of others. True orthodoxy entails an inward condition; it derives from the ethical truths of the Bible, not from an immoderate passion to protect or foster a religious faction to which one belongs only by virtue of birth or upbringing. Unlike earlier addresses on this theme, Hollebeek's was not addressed to any confessional public. He was not particularly interested in maintaining the specific doctrines of a certain church (as the stricter theologians in his audience realized well enough: apparently they were not amused by his address). His oration is primarily concerned, not with the resolution of theological dispute as a means of maintaining and strengthening the confessional public sphere, but with deflecting the deist and materialist attack on Christianity by presenting the Christian faith as both essential to civilization and antithetical to conflict. By the 1760s, the attack of anti-Christian critics was perceived as a direct assault on the ethic of freedom, reason, and sincerity to which all "polite" (beschaafde) and "enlightened" (verlichte) citizens aspired.
To put it another way, Hollebeek's address is representative of a "polite" civil ethic-of the moral code of a polite, rather than confessional, public sphere.
The development of this polite ethic was closely connected with changes in the relations between the individual, on the one hand, and church, society, and the state, on the other hand. The intricate networks of the old regime, characterized by particularism, patronage, and privilege, were subject to increasing criticism during and after the 1760s. A new public sphere came into existence, based on participation rather than patronage. One need think only of the unprecedented flood of periodicals and other means of publication in this period; the rise of an articulate publishing caste that sought and obtained a public forum for proposals concerning economic, scientific, educational, religious, and literary reform; the development of "enlightened" sociability; and the growth of a sense of national unity and a new political consciousness. The basis for social and political stability was no longer sought in the maintenance of order through privilege and repression, as was the case in the confessional public sphere, but instead through the formation -by the process of beschaving (or what would be called Bildung in German, perhaps civilization in English)-of a nationwide community of citizens.
In this polite public sphere, citizens, civilized both outwardly and inwardly, would be expected to respond to an ethic of freedom, reason, sincerity, and moderation -an ethic believed to reflect the true essence of Christianity (as opposed to both the dogmatic traditionalism of old-regime theologians and the irreverent libertinism of their deist critics). Hence the supporters of politeness began to invest heavily in the production of apologetic writings that not only sought to
prove the simple historical truths of Christendom, but also to explain how the disputatious orthodoxies of the past had led libertines and atheists to wrongfully criticize Christianity itself, rather than just the excesses that had rightfully elicited condemnation. In these apologies, Christianity is associated not with the values of the confessional elite who guarded public doctrine, but with the values of a free citizenry, inwardly convinced of the truth of the Christian faith. A minister of the church must first of all combat disbelief -but with prudence and moderation. 41 Thus moderation became one of the catchwords of the period, so much so that modern historians have been finding it difficult not to label the era as one of Moderation all but turned into a synonym for toleration. 57 As early as 1749, a more "modest conduct toward the Jews" was urged in a moral weekly. It was argued that Christians who insulted Jews were morally inferior to a people who for various reasons failed to acknowledge the truth of Christianity. 58 In the pamphlet literature of the period, "a Moderate" became a synonym for "a Tolerant."
Both were identified with one who kept to the Christian mean and who sought to prevail over religious differences. 59 Toleration entailed the dissolution of differences and the development of a common humanity, the way to achieve which was to exercise "moderation and indulgence." 60 Thus, the combined virtues of modesty and moderation were generally regarded as instruments keeping the forces of traditionalism at bay and preventing the new public ethic from backsliding into authoritarianism, intellectual obscurity, and hypocrisy. Modesty and moderation were commonly seen as moral qualities enabling citizens to express themselves sincerely, openly, and with impunity; again we remark the link between moderation and frankness. As the Mennonite Johannes Stinstra said in the early 1740s: "The matter [of religious freedom] obliges us, albeit with Christian modesty and with humble respect for Your imposing authority, to openly defend the truth and speak with appropriate candor." The freedom of sincere expression, he added, is only denied "by the passion, immodesty and lust for power" of intolerant theologians. 61 Later in the century, the freedom of political expression (and, therefore, also press freedom) was added to the freedom of religious expression, but with the same caveat. Burghers were free to voice their views on government as long as they did so with the "modesty and indulgence befitting people who are only partially schooled in the matters on which they wish to judge." 62
Moderation and modesty, rather than being reserved for academic and confessional disputation, were now presented as conditions enabling any free but polite expression of ideas-including criticism of the formal confessions accepted by ecclesiastical institutions (as an orthodox commentator noted, to his dismay). 63 An essay in the Dutch Spectator, "On the Use and Misuse of Liberty, " argued more generally that liberty required the exercise of moderation, which in turn entailed rationality and reasonableness. 64 One of the major review periodicals founded in the 1770s, the ambitions of which were explicitly apologetic, used the device "Candide & Modeste" on its title page. 65 By the end of the century, it was an unquestioned belief that debates on religion were to be conducted with "candor and moderation": 66 it was at this time that the periodical called the Modest Church
Reformer was founded. 67
The Mean: In Praise of Mediocrity Closely related to the rise of apologetic writing as an expression of the polite public ethic was the rise of historical criticism in biblical exegesis. For if disbelieving wits and impious philosophers were to be convinced of their frightful errors, theologians would have to employ methods that were both modern and rational. In these and a multitude of contemporary texts, moderation was naturally portrayed as the ability to avoid extremes. 73 the praise of mediocrity as a national attribute in general, and its application to the realm of Dutch beaux arts in particular. Van der Palm contended that mediocrity -het middelmatige in the Latin sense of mediocritas, "that which is of middle degree"-can be understood in three senses. First, it can signify the golden mean, the prudent avoidance of emotional extremes. Second, mediocrity may refer to those unexceptional things to which we usually remain indifferent because they are simply not good enough for us. Third, and this is the sense in which van der Palm wished to use it, mediocrity can mean the average. In this last sense, it refers to the inconspicuous, the ordinary and the diurnal, and to the qualities of mind and heart common to the larger part of mankind. It is the kind of mediocrity praised by Horace.
There are those, observed Van der Palm, who despise mediocrity from a position of intellectual or social eminence; yet eminence can only be judged in comparison with the average. 79 Mediocre people make up an important social group. Forming the basis of our society, they include "decent household fathers, useful citizens, honest civil servants, busy traders, the untiring promoters of professions and handicrafts"-in brief, they represent "everything that may be called Aristotelianism had been out of fashion since the rise of Cartesianism in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic and the incursion, somewhat later, of New-
79. As an accomplished neo-Latinist, Van der Palm uses the word uitsteken in the Latin sense of eminentia, which is derived from eminere, to "stick out" (above others). tonianism; but Aristotle's golden rule achieved a popularity in the early nineteenth century that it had not enjoyed for a long time. In the 1800s, every informed theologian still knew that Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, had defined virtue as the mean between two extremes, as the average between deficiency and excess. One of the leading theologians of the first half of the nineteenth century observed that along with one of the greatest thinkers of antiquity (Aristotle, of course), the Bible too praised virtue as the mean between extremes. The book of Proverbs, for instance, recommends cautious thrift as the middle way between miserliness and dissipation. The praise of mediocrity by other ancient authorities, this theologian added, is too well known to be reiterated but then reiterates it: 83 while Horace frequently counseled his public to live for the moment-carpe diem is a principal theme in his poetry-he also insisted on the golden mean of moderation, 84 and Cicero too believed mediocrity to be the best rule. 85 It should be noted that the Dutch were not the only ones anxious in this period to achieve the mean in all things. During the reign of Louis-Philippe, between 1830 and 1848, moderation and prudence were embodied in the concept of the juste-milieu (a term taken from Pascal), as a way to integrate the revolution into French society and regulate its threat of dispute, violence, and social upheaval. As for Germany, mediation became, according to Charles Taylor, a "cosmic principle" in Hegel's philosophy. 86 German theologians coined the term Vermittlungstheologie around the middle of the century to name a "mediating theology" designed to find a middle ground between the natural and supernatural. 87 In various parts of nineteenth-century Europe, the concept of the Mittelstand (middle class) was developing. 88 But the Dutch seem to have been unique in regarding mediocrity and the mean primarily as moral rather than purely social categories, and by turning them into national virtues.
Convinced that a Latinate education was essential to preserving the intellectual status of a small nation in a world dominated by French, German, and (to Ypey, Beknopte letterkundige geschiedenis der systematische godgeleerdheid, 2.XI: "Soon the day will come when all mankind will together adopt the safe middle course, and, cured of all blindness, will embrace the simple truth with well-founded affection." a somewhat lesser extent) English culture, 89 the Dutch cherished classical authors and, in their wake, advocacy of the golden mean. A wide acknowledgment developed that Dutch intellectual traditions had always avoided the Scylla of rationalism (represented by Spinoza, the deists, and Kant) and the Charybdis of enthusiasm (represented by chiliasts, revivalists, Schelling, and German Romanticism in general). The main contribution of the placid, commonsensical Dutch was, in effect, to steer the ship of humanity safely through the many rocks and whirlpools in the maritime landscape. As one academic theologian observed, warning against Kant's philosophy, the purpose of university education is to carefully enlighten students in order to make them see, not expose them to immoderate light so that they are blinded. 90 Although the Dutch readily recognized the earlier significant contributions of German divines, particularly in the field of historical criticism, "liberal" theology was increasingly regarded as a mode of thought suited perfectly to the Dutch mind. Dutch theology, asserted a professor who typically chose the middle path between Kant's rationalism and Schelling's enthusiasm, is to be valued as liberal the more it is associated with prudence and modesty. 91 The Leiden theologian Johannes Clarisse (1770 -1846) devoted a full address to the topic in 1815, defining the liberal theologian as one who combines erudition with prudent sincerity, moral freedom, and modest restraint. 92 Social and intellectual mediocrity was, then, a prime feature of the earlynineteenth-century bourgeois class, and it was uncommonly proud of the fact.
The harmonious clerical chorus singing in praise of mediocrity was, however, somewhat brusquely interrupted in 1854 by a church historian, Christiaan Sepp, who attempted to sum up the achievements of his immediate predecessors. Generally accusing the theologians of the first half of the nineteenth century of vagueness and half-heartedness, he focused especially on their avoidance of extremes, their willingness to accommodate, their eagerness to give and takeon their penchant, in short, for "mediation" (bemiddeling). 93 One of the old-guard divines, Herman Bouman (1789 -1864), professor at Utrecht between 1823 and 1859, retaliated with a lengthy book in defense of his defunct colleagues. Mediation, he claimed, was superior to radicalism from a moral point of view, because it made due allowance for human limitations. Modesty is the opposite of rashness; while modesty mediates in disputes, rashness begets and fosters discord:
It has always been in the nature of violent political and theological factiousness that rash people should prefer to tolerate a declared, outright opponent, over whose errors it seems easy to triumph, rather than a man who, though valuing the good in everything, chooses an independent course and refuses to be dominated by anyone's fame or authority. It is easier for factious people to accuse the latter, with ostentatious rhetoric, of vagueness and half-heartedness and sometimes even insincerity, than contradict by concise argument the views he holds with such composed moderation. 94 The man who calmly and steadfastly opts for the middle course will always be misjudged by disputatious extremists and the common crowd; yet the aurea mediocritas is a sure path to well-being: "Oh, that past and present nations would have followed the same rule of moderation in their civil and social life!" 95
The Dutch Way? May we conclude that the ideas on dispute adduced by Dutch divines constitute a and ultimately national public. Dispute had once been universally accepted as a primary means of establishing and communicating truth (especially religious truth); it had been possible to control its possibly disrupting consequences by enjoining upon all participants to respect a moral code centered on modesty.
Excessive disputatiousness, epitomized by the odium theologicum, was simply an unfortunate result of the lack of self-discipline. Later in the period, the problem of intellectual -or ideological -conflict was regulated by disqualifying dispute altogether. Dispute among moderate and tolerant Christians was not done, since this merely played into the hands of irreligious critics; the latter were those who ought to be confuted -though prudently, reasonably, and politely. In the end, dispute was excluded from the domain of national culture altogether. After about 1800, disputatiousness was considered all but incompatible with Dutchness. To be Dutch was to be conciliatory, seek consensus, avoid conflict.
Although it would hardly be true to say that dispute has been absent from the Netherlands since 1840, it does appear that the habit of regulating dispute by disqualifying it eventually became ingrained in Dutch culture and politics. After the nation-state and its concomitant ideology evolved in the decades around 1800, the Dutch tended to adhere to the bourgeois norm of the mean. They still do. An ostentatious display of genius and excellence is often frowned upon, and mediocrity is still regarded as the best way to keep the peace and achieve consensus. 96 Indeed, the flat landscape of the Dutch polders is itself a permanent natural homage to mediocrity. 97 The Dutch "polder model" of the 1980s and 1990s, an economic system based on consensus between employers and labor organizations with a view to controlling wage levels, rests on older ideas concerning mediation and the mean. It is an open question whether this tradition of consensus and toleration currently runs much deeper than the superficial wish to avoid anxiety and distress on the part of an affluent middle class, and whether it will be able to withstand the contemporary breakdown of the traditional nationstate. After periods of intense religious conflict and political discord, the Dutch learned to regulate dispute by barring open conflict from the public domain.
Though it may not be the best solution conceivable, it has been a relatively salutary one. But there is a price to pay. 
